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1 Introduction
In many business environments, including agriculture, economic agents often interact with
each other repeatedly and business is conducted using a series of short-term contracts. The
use of contracts to vertically coordinate the production and marketing of agricultural com-
modities has become common practice in many agricultural sectors including livestock, fruits
and vegetables, tobacco, etc. To solve the asymmetric information problems between proces-
sors (principals) and independent farmers (agents), the majority of contracts use high powered
incentives schemes to compensate farmers. Another interesting characteristic of many pro-
duction contracts is that all agents contracting with the same principal are operating under
formally identical contract provisions (Levy and Vukina, 2002). However, explicitly uniform
contracts may not necessarily guarantee that all agents are treated equally. When the principal
and agents contract repeatedly, an explicitly uniform but incomplete contract leaves a possi-
bility for the principal to treat agents differently after learning about their types (abilities, risk
aversions, costs of effort, etc.). Typically, these contracts specify a general payment formula
that expresses the agent’s reward as a function of his performance but in which the base pay-
ment and the incentive power of the contract depend on the provision of some inputs by the
principal. Introducing the choice of these strategic variables as part of the contract design, the
principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts
tailored to fit agents’ preferences or characteristics.
The objective of this paper is to study this contract design problem, to present a method
that would allow the identification and estimation of the structural parameters of the moral
hazard model, and to test predictions aimed at assessing the empirical reliability of the model.
In order to identify the heterogeneity among agents, we assume that they have different risk
aversion attitudes and different costs of effort and that their characteristics are observed by
the principal. In the empirical part of the paper we use a panel data containing individual
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settlements of livestock production contracts. Our analysis explains an apparent anomaly fre-
quently observed in many agricultural contracts which manifests itself in the principal’s use of
seemingly uniform contracts for the purposes of governing the relationships with heterogeneous
agents.1
Empirical tests of contract theory are typically performed with either cross-industry and
cross-firm data or with intra-firm data. As pointed out by Chiappori and Salanié (2003), the
first approach can provide more general empirical results but faces the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity (for the econometrician). The second type of data will generate the results
that are difficult to generalize but has the advantage of dealing with agents that operate in
the same environment, which removes a lot of the potential unobserved heterogeneity. This
research belongs to the second category of studies. Our data comes from payroll records of one
company that contracts the production of live hogs with independent farmers.
The literature concerned with empirical testing of contract theory related to this paper
follows two distinct approaches. One line of research takes contracts as given and model
the behavior of the principal and the agents under the observed contractual terms without
assuming optimal contract design. For example, interesting studies in labor economics of
Paarsch and Shearer (2000, 2007) use the information on incentive contracts and longitudinal
individual outputs in order to estimate how effort responds to incentives provided by piece
rate contracts. They do not study the optimal contract design nor do they assume contract
optimality to identify the model primitives. However, certain aspects of their approach is
1A related topic more linked to the adverse selection problem in a similar environment has been studied by
Leegomonchai and Vukina (2005). They test whether chicken companies allocate production inputs of varying
quality by providing high ability agents with high-quality inputs or by providing low ability agents with high
quality inputs. The first strategy would stimulate the career concerns type of response on the part of the
growers, whereas the second strategy would generate a ratchet effect. Their results show no significant input
discrimination based on grower abilities that would lead to either career concerns or ratchet effect type of
dynamic incentives.
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related to ours because they use an assumption about the contract design to identify the
heterogeneity of agents regarding their cost of effort. Their assumption is not specifically an
optimality assumption because they assume that the employer cannot discriminate between
workers according to their observable cost of effort. Instead they assume that the contract is
designed to satisfy at least the participation constraint of the least able worker. Other papers
within the same paradigm include, for example, Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman, and Pinquet
(2003); Chiappori, Durand, Geoffard (1998); Ferrall and Shearer (1999); and Shearer (2004).
They take advantage of the fact that they can observe the actual contracts and eventually
some changes in the contract forms, which enable them to test various implications of moral
hazard.
The other line of research in empirical testing of contract theory explicitly or implicitly
assumes that contracts are optimal. Then, it derives predictions about the determinants of
some observed contract parameters and test those predictions empirically. This approach is
often used when one does not observe all of the exact contractual terms agreed upon between a
principal and an agent. A good example of this approach is the empirical work on sharecropping
contracts where the goal is usually to test between the alternative theories of contract design,
for example the transaction cost versus the risk sharing explanation (Allen and Lueck, 1994,
Dubois, 2002, Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002).
Our paper presents the combination of the above two approaches. First, we empirically
check several testable implications of the incentive theory without assuming the contract op-
timality. The fact that we can precisely observe all relevant contract stipulations allows us to
model the agent’s behavior in a way that is consistent with the assumption that contracts are
either optimal or suboptimal.2 Second, after modeling the agent’s behavior, we analyze the
2The fact that in the real economy there are many institutional constraints or bounded rationality types of
behavior that may restrain the actors to use theoretically optimal contracts has been well established in the
literature. For a discussion on optimal versus suboptimal contracts, see Chiappori and Salanié (2003).
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principal’s decisions and contract design. We confirm that contract farmers are heterogenous
with respect to their risk preferences and/or their costs of effort and that this heterogeneity
affects the principal’s decision of how to allocate the production inputs across farmers. Using
the identifying assumption that contracts are optimal, we obtain estimates of a lower and
an upper bound on agents’ reservation utilities. We also show that farmers with higher risk
aversion have lower outside opportunities due to lower reservation utilities.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on testing the trade-off between risk and incen-
tives. When it comes to the determination of contract choice, the transaction cost literature
(e.g., Allen and Lueck, 1992) claims the unimportance of risk. On the other hand, Pennings
and Smidts (2000) found that the degree of risk aversion is important in explaining owner-
managers’ choice between relatively safe fixed-price contracts versus spot market transactions.
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) showed that if one controls for the endogenous matching be-
tween principals and agents, the agent’s risk aversion appears to significantly influence the
contract choice. When it comes to testing whether risk imposes a constraint to offering incen-
tives the evidence is also mixed, with some work finding evidence in favor of the theories, while
other find little (Prendergast, 1999, 2002). In our structural model, we show that individual
risk aversion or cost of effort identified with the longitudinal performance data actually affects
the principal’s optimal contract choice in which she must balance the incentives and the risk
sharing in a moral hazard environment.
2 Industry Description and Data
Swine production in the United States is characterized by an increasing presence of verti-
cally integrated firms (called integrators) that contract the production (grow-out) of hogs
with independent farmers. The contract production is dominated by large national companies
(Smithfield Foods, Tyson, etc.,) that run their businesses through smaller profit centers that
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issue contracts, supply inputs and slaughter finished animals.
A production contract is an agreement between an integrator company and a farmer
(grower) that binds the farmer to specific production practices. Different stages of produc-
tion of animals are typically covered by different contracts and farmers generally specialize in
the production of animals under one contract. The most frequently observed contracts in the
swine industry are single production stage contracts such as farrowing contracts, nursery con-
tracts and especially finishing contracts. All production contracts have two main components:
one is the division of responsibility for providing inputs, and the other is the method used to
determine grower compensation. Growers provide land, housing facilities, utilities (electricity
and water) and labor and are also responsible for manure management and disposal of dead
animals. An integrator company provides animals, feed, medications and services of field men.
Companies also own and operate feed mills and processing plants and provide transportation
of feed and live animals. When it comes to specifying integrator’s responsibilities for providing
inputs, the terms of the contract are intentionally vague. The integrator decides on the volume
of production both in terms of the rotations of batches on a given farm as well as the number
(density) and weight of incoming animals (feeder pigs) inside the house. A typical scheme for
compensating growers in finishing contracts is based on a base plus bonus payment per pound
of gain (live weight) transferred, where a bonus payment reflects some efficiency measure such
as feed conversion.
The data set used in this study is an unbalanced panel from Martin (1997). It contains a
sample of contract settlement data for individual growers who contracted the finishing stage of
hog production with an integrator in North Carolina. The data set spans the period between
December 1985 and April 1993, for a total of 802 observations. Each observation represents
one contract realization, i.e., the payment received and the grower performance associated with
one batch of animals delivered to the integrator’s processing plant. There are 122 growers in
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the data set and the number of observations per grower ranges from 2 to 37.3
The size of the grow-out operation (the number of finishing houses) varies across growers
between one and five houses. All houses under contract have approximately the same maximal
capacity. The median density of a house is 1,226 hogs per house and the mean density is 1,234
hogs per house. The contract coverage varies across farms and time. Sometimes one contract
will cover multiple houses on a given farm, other times each house will be covered by a separate
contract. In cases when multiple houses are covered by one contract, the grower payment is
calculated by treating all houses as one unit. The coverage of the contract is determined by
the timing of the placement and genetic composition of feeder pigs. The animals covered by
the same contract have to be placed on a given farm at the same time and have to have similar
genetic characteristics. The average length of the production cycle is approximately 19 weeks.
Counting one additional week for the necessary cleanup gives a maximum of 2.6 batches of
finished hogs per house per year. The data summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
The particular finishing contract that generated the data is fairly representative for the
industry as a whole. The contract requires that growers furnish fully equipped housing facilities
and that they follow the management and husbandry practices specified by the integrator. The
contract guarantees the grower a minimum of 7 batches of feeder pigs and is automatically
renewed unless canceled in writing. The integrator provides the grower with feeder pigs, feed,
medication, veterinary services and services of the field personnel. The quality of all inputs
as well as the time of placement of feeder pigs and shipment of grown animals are exclusively
under control of the integrator.
The compensation to grower i for the batch of hogs under contract t, as the payment
for husbandry services and the housing facilities rental, is calculated on a per pound of gain
basis with bonuses earned on a per head basis. The bonus is based on the difference between
3It appears that the data sample has been extracted randomly from the population of all contracts that has
been settled between this integrator and her growers during this time period.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Feed conversion ratio (fit) 2.76 0.151
Grower’s revenue in US$ (Rit) 18 886 10 022
Heads placed (Hit) 2 077 1 111
Mortality rate (mit) 0.039 0.020
Feed used in (1000) pounds (Fit) 1 033 553
Weight gained in (1000) pounds (qit) 373 195
Weight of incoming feeder pigs in pounds (κ0it) 44.16 5.05
Weight of outgoing finished hogs in pounds (κit) 234.22 7.71
Price of feed (in US$ per 100 pounds) 11.13 0.3
Price of hogs (in US$ per 100 pounds) 44.85 11.1
Price of feeder pigs (in US$ per 100 pounds) 83.51 14.1
Prices of feed, hogs and feeder pigs varied during the period sampled by the data.
the individual grower’s feed conversion, expressed as pounds of feed divided by pounds of
gain Fitqit , and a standard feed conversion ratio φ. If the grower’s ratio is above the standard,
he receives no bonus and simply earns the base piece rate α multiplied by the total pounds
gained qit. If the grower’s ratio is below the standard ratio, the difference is multiplied by a
constant β to determine the per head bonus rate. The total bonus payment is then determined
by multiplying the bonus rate by the number of pigs marketed, where the marketed pigs
(1 −mit)Hit are those feeder pigs that survived the fattening process and mit is the animal
mortality rate. Algebraically, the exact formula for the total compensation is:
Rit = αqit +max[0, β(φ−
Fit
qit
)(1−mit)Hit]. (1)
During the period covered by the data set some parameters of the payment mechanism
(1) have changed. The base piece rate varied with the type of feeder pigs placed on a grower
farm. For commingled feeder pigs α = 0.0315, whereas for integrator’s own nursery feeder pigs
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α = 0.0275.4 Also, as a result of technological progress in nutrition and housing design, the
feed conversion standard was lowered from φ = 3.50 to φ = 3.35. However, after the lower
feed conversion standard was introduced, the higher standard of 3.50 remained in effect for
commingled pigs. Consequently, we have three different payment schemes: (α = 0.0315, φ =
3.50), (α = 0.0275, φ = 3.50) and (α = 0.0275, φ = 3.35). All observed feed conversion ratios
are below the benchmark feed conversion (φ), so the truncation of the bonus payment at zero
will be ignored and the payment scheme simplified5 as
Rit = αqit + β(φ−
Fit
qit
)(1−mit)Hit. (2)
Notice that the imposed simplification bears very little consequence on the riskiness of the
payment scheme. The risk that the grower is exposed to is due to the variance of his revenue
Rit which is the result of his performance measured by the feed conversion ratio Fitqit that is
affected by random shocks. Although the truncation at zero never binds, there is considerable
variability in feed conversion ratios and hence payments across growers. In fact, the elimination
of the truncation of the bonus payment at zero, if it were actually introduced by the integrator
into the contract, might increase the variability of an individual grower payment relative to
his peers, but in this particular empirical case it is inconsequential.
In addition to individual grower contract settlement data, the proposed methodology re-
quires the integrator-level price data for the inputs and the output. However, such data is not
available. Instead we use the regional market prices for feed, feeder pigs and finished hogs, also
obtained from Martin (1997). The feed prices are quarterly figures for the Appalachian region,
the feeder pig prices are monthly observations for North Carolina and the market prices for
4There are three types of feeder pigs in the data set. Commingled pigs are feeder pigs that are either bought
at an auction or from an outside source. The third type are own feeder pigs which come from the breeding stock
controlled by the integrator, hence are deemed to be of superior quality.
5 In principle, the truncation at zero should modify ex-ante the behavior of the agent, but it is ignored for
tractability and also because it is far from being empirically operant and thus unlikely to affect the behavior of
agents.
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finished hogs are monthly prices received by North Carolina farmers for barrows and gilts.6
3 The Model
We model the integrator-grower relationship in a principal-agent framework. The timing of
the contractual game played between the principal and the agent is as follows. The principal
(integrator) proposes the contract to the agents (growers) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The
contract specifies the division of responsibilities for providing inputs and the payment formula.
The integrator is required to provide animals (feeder pigs) and feed and the grower is required
to provide housing for animals and labor (exert effort). After the grower observes the payment
formula, the number and the weight of incoming feeder pigs supplied by the integrator, he
accepts or rejects the contract. A grower that accepted the contract then exerts effort.
The tasks performed by the grower are not perfectly observable by the integrator, who
therefore faces a moral hazard problem in the delegation of production tasks. The incentives
to the grower to behave according to the principal’s objective are provided through the payment
scheme which always includes a particular type of bonus (premium) mechanism. In our data,
the bonus depends on a perfectly observable and verifiable performance measure which is the
feed conversion ratio. The agent’s payment (2) can then be written as a linear function of the
performance measure, i.e. the feed conversion ratio fit = Fitqit , such that
Rit = α˜it − β˜it (fit − φ) (3)
where the fixed component (α˜it) and the slope (β˜it) of this linear function depend on some
parameters as
α˜it = α˜it (κ0it,Hit) = αqit = α [κit (1−mit)− κ0it]Hit (4)
β˜it = β˜it (Hit) = β(1−mit)Hit (5)
6The procedure to convert the quarterly prices into monthly figures and the exact matching of the monthly
prices to contract settlement dates is explained in detail in Martin (1997).
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with κit being the weight of outgoing finished hogs, κ0it the weight of incoming feeder pigs,
and Hit the number of heads of animals placed on the farm. When the principal proposes
the contract to the agent, he proposes the payment scheme (3) where parameters α˜it and β˜it
are known. Thus, at the time the agent has to accept or reject the contract, the contractual
payment consists of a fixed payment α˜it, and a premium part which is tied to the performance
(fit − φ) with the known incentive power β˜it. After accepting the contract, the agent exerts
effort.
We consider that the parameters of this affine function are fixed at the time the grower
chooses his effort and that the only source of risk comes from the performance in terms of
feed conversion. The assumption that the parameters α˜it and β˜it depend on conditions and
variables known and observed by the grower when he chooses his effort is reasonable. Actually,
the grower always observes the number Hit and the weight κ0it of feeder pigs when they arrive
on the farm. The grower also knows that the pigs are grown until they reach their target
weight κit. Finally, the grower can accurately judge the mortality rate mit by observing the
genetic make-up and the overall condition of feeder pigs delivered to the farm and the density
at which they are stocked. Empirically, we see that there is actually very little variation in
mortality rates given Hit and little variation in the weight κit of finished animals. Thus, it is
true that α˜it and β˜it are known as soon as Hit and κ0it are known.
3.1 Theory of agent behavior
We assume that grower i’s preferences over revenue Rit and effort eit at period t are described
by the utility function Ui(Rit − Ci(eit)) which is known by the principal. Ci(.) is a positive
increasing function implying that effort is costly. We assume that growers exhibit constant
absolute risk aversion such that Ui(Rit − Ci(eit)) = −1θi exp−θi(Rit − Ci(eit)) where θi > 0 is
the absolute risk aversion parameter, and also assume that the stochastic revenue is normally
distributed. Under these assumptions, grower i’s expected utility can be expressed as an
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increasing concave function of the mean-variance criterion (which corresponds to the certainty
equivalent value of revenue) and her maximization problem can be written equivalently as:
max
eit
Wi(Rit, eit) = ERit −
θi
2
V arRit − Ci(eit). (6)
Notice that the curvature of the utility function is grower-specific which allows much more
flexibility than when the curvature is common to all agents, i.e. when θi is constant across i.
First, let’s specify how the observed outcome stochastically depends on the unobservable
grower effort and assume that
fit (eit)− φ = (λ− eit)uit (7)
where λ reflects growers’ fixed ability parameter, eit is a costly effort which improves (reduces)
the feed conversion ratio, and uit is an i.i.d. (across growers and periods) normal production
shock with mean of 1 and σ2 variance.7 This specification shows that a unit of effort is worth
one unit of feed conversion ratio which gets transformed into revenue through β˜it. Since the
cost of effort is monetary, it must be in the same units as revenue, hence we specify
C(eit) = γiβ˜iteit
where 0 < γi < 1 is the grower i0s cost of effort8. The cost of effort γi can be interpreted as
a ratio expressing how much it costs in revenue to reduce the feed conversion by an amount
worth one unit of money. Thus it must be below one for the agent to exert a positive value of
effort. Actually the expected marginal benefit of effort is E [−R0it (e)] = β˜it while the marginal
cost is γiβ˜it, so that no effort will be provided (whatever risk aversion) if γi ≥ 1.
7As seen from (7), the random term u has to be positive, which violates the normality assumption and hence
the mean-variance representation of growers’ preferences can only be seen as an approximation of the expected
utility where the utility is exponential (CARA). This approximation is exact when u is normal even if the risk
is not small. The fact that the empirical distribution of u is not too far from being normal helps us justify the
mean-variance criterion approximation even if the risk is large.
8Notice that the apparently more general specification fit−φ = (λ−ρeit)uit is not different from the chosen
one because we could simply redefine effort as eit = ρeit whose cost will be γiρ β˜iteit instead of γiβ˜iteit.
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The above specification of the stochastic production technology with the feed conversion
effort being the only source of moral hazard can be justified on several grounds. First, the
reason for not modeling the weight of the finished animals as the moral-hazard component of the
production is because the final weight of market hogs varies very little, not only within farmers
that grow hogs for the same integrator, but also across the entire industry. There are two
reasons for this: consumers’ preferences for a particular type of pork and the automatization
of the slaughterhouse processing lines. Given consumers’ preferences for various pork items,
there has to be one ideal weight of finished hogs that gives the highest yield and optimal mix of
primary and secondary products. Because of the fact that modern slaughterhouses are highly
automatized, the variability of sizes of animals that need to be processed would require frequent
calibration of the equipment and would considerably slow down the speed of the processing
line.
Second, the animal grow-out technology is described by animals eating ad libidum or "at
will". This means that the feed is always there for them to eat. Given the fact that the
targeted weight is given (and the weight of incoming feeder pigs vary), the growers’ objective
is to produce the targeted weight with as little feed as possible. The aggregate consumption
of feed depends on many factors, some of which growers cannot control (animals genetics and
the quality of feed rations), and others which they can (optimal in-house environment, feed
management, spoilage, pilfering, etc.). Most importantly, the total feed utilization depends
on the number of days that animals spent on the farm, so the trick is to fatten them to the
target weight as quickly as possible. It is very hard to precisely say what exactly farmers do to
improve feed conversion, but the fact of the matter is that some farmers are frequently better
than others. The substantial variation in feed conversion among farms convincingly testifies
to that effect.
Finally, the mortality variations across growers are small and mainly explained by the
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number of feeder pigs placed in growers’ houses as well as their genetic make-up, both variables
being under control of the integrator and not growers.
Then, using (3) and (7) we can write the agent’s certainty equivalent of net revenue as
Wi(Rit, eit) = α˜it − β˜it [Efit − φ]−
θi
2
β˜
2
itV ar [fit]− γiβ˜iteit (8)
and the first order condition for the maximization problem in (6) becomes
− ∂
∂eit
Efit −
θi
2
β˜it
∂
∂eit
V ar [fit] = γi.
Given (7), it is clear that Efit − φ = λ − eit and V ar [fit] = (eit − λ)2 σ2 which gives the
following expression for the optimal effort level:
e∗it =
1− γi
σ2θiβ˜it
+ λ. (9)
A careful inspection of equation (9) reveals three important characteristics of this pro-
duction technology and the contract payment mechanism. First, equilibrium effort decreases
feed conversion ratio (recall that a good feed conversion is a low one) but it also increases its
variance. This is the result of the multiplicative error structure in the production function
(7). The justification for this specification comes from the necessity to model a technology
where exerting low/zero effort would result in the feed conversion ratio attributable only to
the default ability parameter corrected for the shock. Notice that the risk associated with this
strategy is also low. The feed conversion ratio will be predictably bad, but it cannot be worse
that the pigs’ metabolism dictates. Choosing very high effort, on the other hand, improves
expected feed conversion significantly, but it is at the same time risky as it generates high
variability in performance.9
9 Imagine an anxious grower inspecting his pigs every hour just to make sure that they are doing well, whereas
the more normal procedure would be to come only twice a day. By doing this he can possibly introduce some
infectious disease into the housing environment that otherwise with less frequent visits would have not happened.
So, without the disease, the feed conversion is phenomenal because everything was functioning meticulously all
the time. With the disease, however, the feed conversion went sky-high because pigs got diarrhea.
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Second, the optimal effort level depends monotonically on the heterogeneity parameter
eθi = θi1−γi , which, for ease of exposition, we will sometimes simply refer to as the risk aversion,
despite the fact that it actually represents the risk aversion adjusted for the cost of effort.
Risk aversion and cost of effort (higher eθi) both reduce the optimal effort whereas stronger
incentives (−β˜it) increase effort. Lower eθi indicates more efficient growers because of either
lower risk aversion or lower cost of effort, so we will refer to this parameter as the growers’
efficiency parameter.
Thirdly, equation (9) also implies that optimal effort is only affected by the incentives
power of the contract (−β˜it) and not by the constant part of the payment eαit. This result has
a simple consequence for the equilibrium strategy that the integrator (principal) would pursue
when it comes to deciding how many feeder pigs to allocate to each grower (agent) according
to his efficiency parameter.
3.2 Theory of principal behavior - Model 1
Now, we model the principal’s behavior taking into account the agent’s optimal response.
We assume that the principal is risk neutral and maximizes the expected profit per grower.
We start with Model 1 where we assume that the principal has to choose within the class of
payment functions (2) that are empirically observed, but not necessarily optimal. In other
words, here we are not taking into account the participation constraint of the growers that
already signed the contract. The approach that relies on the observed contracts being optimal
will be exploited in section (3.3).
The integrator’s profit function is given by:
πit = pQit − wFFit −Rit (Hit, κ0it)− wH (κ0it)Hit (10)
where p is the market price of hogs, Qit = κit (1−mit)Hit is the total live weight removed
from the grower’s farm, Rit (Hit, κ0it) is the grower payment, wF is the market price of feed
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and wH (κ0it) is the market price of feeder pigs of weight κ0it.
By deciding how many feeder pigs (Hit) of weight κ0it to place on a grower’s farm, the prin-
cipal can vary the contract parameters α˜it and β˜it. As mentioned before, the contracts between
the integrator and all agents have the same structure (summarized by the payment scheme
(2)), but the allocation of integrator-supplied inputs among growers of different characteristics
is not stipulated in the general contract and the integrator can choose them unilaterally in
his dealings with each individual grower. Within the class of contractual payments that are
observed in the data, varying the quantity and quality of production inputs across growers
allows the integrator to use his bargaining power in designing individual incentive contracts
for each grower. This approach will generate some predictions about the principal’s "optimal
choices".
As required by the theory, optimal contracts should depend on agent’s preferences and her
outside opportunities. In particular, the incentive power of the contract in a moral hazard en-
vironment should depend on the particular trade-off between risk sharing and incentives that
depends on the agent’s preferences, whereas the fixed component of the contractual payment
should depend on the agent’s reservation utility. As agent’s preferences (risk aversion) and
reservation utilities (depending on outside options and preferences) are likely to be heteroge-
nous, we expect that the principal will tailor particular incentive contracts according to the
agent’s types. The specification used enables the partitioning of the effects of risk aversion and
reservation utilities into the constant and variable parts of the payment.
The problem faced by the integrator is to choose the contract parameters in order to
maximize his profit under the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
of the agent. Assuming that reservation utilities are not time-varying, this can be formally
described as follows:
max
Hit,κ0it
Eπit = E[pQit − wFFit −Rit (Hit, κ0it)− wH (κ0it)Hit] (11)
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subject to
EUi(Rit − C(e∗it)|κ0it,Hit) ≥ U i
and
e∗it = argmaxeit
EUi(Rit (Hit, κ0it)− C(eit)|κ0it,Hit)
where Rit (Hit, κ0it) = α˜it (κ0it,Hit)− β˜it (Hit) (fit(e∗it)− φ) and U i is the reservation utility of
agent i.
Using the certainty equivalent of the agent’s utility like in Section 3.1, and incorporating
the incentive constraint in the profit function of the principal by replacing the effort level by
its optimal value, the principal’s maximization program is thus equivalent to:
max
Hit,κ0it
Eπ∗it (Hit, κ0it) = E[pQit − wFFit −Rit (Hit, κ0it)− wH (κ0it)Hit] (12)
subject to
Wi(Rit (Hit, κ0it)) ≥W i
whereW i = U−1i (U i), the functionWi(.) is defined as in (8), and π
∗
it denotes the profit function
that incorporates the optimal effort (given by the incentive constraint).
In order to characterize the principal’s maximization program max
Hit,κ0it
Eπ∗it (Hit, κ0it) we need
to examine the functional forms of the cost function for feeder pigs wH (κ0) and the mortality
function mit (H). Towards this objective, we introduce two assumptions:
• Assumption 1: wH (.) is increasing convex.
Assumption 1 is likely to be satisfied if wH (κ0) reflects the cost of raising live animals
to weight κ0 because feed conversion rapidly worsens (increases) with heavier animals and
therefore the feeding costs progressively increase as animals grow larger. Price data on different
weights of feeder pigs show that this assumption is generally satisfied.
17
• Assumption 2: mit (Hit) is increasing concave with m00(1 −m) + 2m02 ≥ 0 and 2m0 +
m00H > 0.
In Assumption 2 we assume that the mortality rate functionmit (Hit) is such that the profit
function has a unique maximum
³
H∗it(eθi), κ∗0it(eθi)´. It is obvious that the number of animals
placed on a grower’s farm cannot be infinite given that the housing facilities are of finite size.
The mortality rate will be increasing and necessarily approaching 100% when H approaches
infinity. This implies that profits will obtain at a maximum for H <∞.
If we label the number of animals shipped (i.e., the number of animals that survived the
fattening process) as Hsit = (1−mit (Hit))Hit, then the condition 2m0 +m00H > 0 is simply
equivalent to assuming that the number of animals survived Hsit(Hit) is a concave function of
the number of animals placed Hit (Hs00it (Hit) < 0). For example, this assumption is satisfied
on [0, 2η] with the mortality rate function10
mit (Hit) = 1− exp−
Hit
η
; with η > 0. (13)
Now we are in the position to state the following two results:
Proposition 1: The optimal decisions (H∗it(eθi), κ∗0it(eθi)) made by the integrator are such
that ∂κ
∗
0it
∂eθi is positive if and only if the elasticity of survived animals with respect to the efficiency
parameter eθi is larger than −1, that is:
∂κ∗0it
∂eθi > 0⇔ ∂ lnH
s∗
it
∂ lneθi > −1
where ∂ lnH
s∗
it
∂ lneθi = ∂ ln[(1−mit(H
∗
it))H∗it]
∂ lneθi .
Proof: See Appendix 6.1. ¤
10 In fact, the condition 2m0 +m00H > 0 is satisfied in this case if Hit < 2η. We will check empirically that η
is sufficiently large compared to the range of values of H.
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Proposition 2: If the following conditions are satisfied:
p− φwF + α > 0
φwF − α− w0H (κ0it) < 0
∂ lnκ∗0it
∂ lneθi + ∂ ln∂ lneθi
µ
∂
∂H∗it
µ
1
1−mit(H∗it)
¶¶
< 1
then, the optimal decisions
³
H∗it(eθi), κ∗0it(eθi)´ of the principal are such that
∂H∗it
∂eθi < 0⇒ ∂κ
∗
0it
∂eθi > 0.
Proof: See Appendix 6.2. ¤
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the optimal decisions of the integrator in terms of the
number and weight of animals (feeder pigs) placed with contract growers must satisfy some
equilibrium conditions such that, under some mild conditions that will be empirically verified,
less efficient growers (either more risk averse or growers with a higher cost of effort) should
either receive both fewer and heavier animals or more and lighter animals. This means that
if less efficient growers are charged with less demanding task of tending for fewer animals,
then they will also receive a "head start" in terms of their feeder pigs being heavier such that
they will take less time to grow to market weight. This optimal strategy results from the
principal’s objective to minimize the total cost of moral hazard due to the delegation of tasks
to heterogenous agents with their effort being unobservable.
In order to test these propositions, eθi needs to be identified at least up to a scale. The
results provide a test of the model since the structure can be rejected if, for example, ∂H
∗
it
∂eθi < 0
and ∂κ
∗
0it
∂eθi < 0, or if ∂κ
∗
0it
∂eθi and (1 + ∂ lnH
s∗
it
∂ lneθi ) have opposite signs.
3.3 Theory principal behavior - Model 2
Recall that in Model 1 of the previous section, we ignored the workings of the growers’ par-
ticipation constraint. This could have been justified by either implicitly assuming that the
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participation constraint is automatically satisfied for all growers who signed such contracts,
or alternatively, by arguing that principals are not legally constrained to use any particular
remuneration scheme for agents and therefore those payment schedules that we observe are in
fact optimal.
When explicitly assuming that contracts are optimal, one has to determine whether the
participation constraint is binding or not. If the principal can only choose κ0it and Hit to
maximize profit and if he has to use the payment formula in (2), then there is no reason for
the participation constraint to be binding. Actually, one can see that the choice of κ0it and Hit
moves the parameters of the linear payment α˜it and β˜it the same way as the principal could do
by choosing α˜it and β˜it directly, but unlike in the standard principal-agent models, κ0it and Hit
also change some other component of the principal’s profit function. However, if manipulating
the choice variables makes the participation constraint not binding, the principal can easily
make it binding by adding or subtracting a fixed transfer to the agent’s revenue Rit. Adding
such a constant does not change the incentive constraint (as shown by the expression for the
optimal effort (9)), thus the principal can perform the maximization program by incorporating
only the incentive constraint and then ask for a fixed transfer from the agent in case the
participation constraint is not binding.
Therefore, since we exactly observe the contract agreed between the principal and the agent,
assuming that the observed contract is optimal, one can deduce that the optimal solution of
the program (11) is such that (H∗it, κ
∗
0it) = argmax
Hit,κ0it
Eπ∗it (Hit, κ0it) and that the participation
constraint is binding
Wit(Rit (H∗it, κ
∗
0it) , e
∗
it) =W i. (14)
Replacing e∗it by its analytical expression from (9) we obtain the expression for the certainty
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equivalent measure of an agent’s utility
Wit(Rit (Hit, κ0it) , e∗it) = α˜it − β˜it [Efit − φ]−
θi
2
β˜
2
itV ar [fit]− γiβ˜ite∗it
= α˜it +
(1− γi)2
2σ2θi
− γiλβ˜it, (15)
that will be subsequently used to identify the heterogeneity in growers’ reservation utilities.11
4 Identification and Estimation Results
Using the panel data described before, we can now estimate the structural model we developed
so far. Remark that the identification that follows is obtained because of the variation of
contracts across periods for a given grower in addition to the variation across growers. Actually,
the number and weight of animals provided to growers at each period is varying for a given
grower and thus make the payment scheme vary through variations of α˜it and β˜it. We assume
that this variation is exogenous (shocks uit in production function are uncorrelated with α˜it and
β˜it) and comes from the upstream variations in the total demand for the Principal.
Then, substituting (9) in (7) yields the formula for the difference between the benchmark
feed conversion φ and the equilibrium feed conversion f∗it as
φ− f∗it =
1− γi
β˜itσ2θi
uit (16)
which by taking logs gives the following equation
ln((φ− f∗it) β˜it) = − ln(σ2eθi) + ln(uit). (17)
As (φ− f∗it) β˜it is observed, the individual level parameters ln(σ2eθi) in (17) can be estimated
with a linear regression including growers fixed effects. Moreover, as σ2 = var(uit), we can
11Of course, the identification of Model 2 critically depends on our assertion that in the empirically observed
contracts the transfer payments are exactly zero. Based on our substantial practical knowledge of this industry,
we are reasonably confident that this claim is correct. However, the existence of some side payments that are
not reported on contract settlement sheets would render our identification of reservation utilities invalid.
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identify σ2 as the variance of the exponential of the error terms, which leads to the identification
of the efficiency parameter eθi = θi1−γi . As 0 < γi < 1, implies that θi < eθi, eθi allows the
identification of an upper bound of the risk aversion parameter θi. Once the estimates of eθi are
known, one can test for the heterogeneity of grower types (their risk aversions normalized by
the cost of effort). Keep in mind that the identification of eθi comes from the assumption that
shocks uit are uncorrelated with the heterogeneity parameter and that the growers’ efficiency
parameters eθi are constant across time and contracts.
The estimation of (17) shows that the unexplained variance accounts for around 50% of the
total variance. We do not show the full set of parameter estimates but testing that all ln(eθi)
are equal strongly rejects the homogeneity of growers with respect to their risk aversions or the
costs of effort (F (121, 680) = 5.34). Remark that even when we remove the set of growers that
have the fewer number of contracts in the data, our main results stay the same. The distribution
of efficiency parameters eθi displayed in Figure 1 is characterized by the fact that the median
efficiency parameter equals 17.32 while the 25th percentile value of the distribution equals
12.0 and the 75th percentile equals 21.84. In addition to showing substantial heterogeneity
of grower types, the results also indicate that the estimated heterogeneity parameters are
negatively correlated with the size of the growers’ production facilities. The average of eθi for
growers that operates only one housing unit is 21.4, whereas for others (who have mostly 2 or
3 houses), it is 12.9.12
4.1 Performance
Our next objective is to test whether the theoretical implications of the model are consistent
with the data. We first check whether the sufficient conditions on the mortality function
12As suggested by one referee, it would be interesting to see how the estimated risk aversion parameters
are correlated with other growers’ characteristics. However, in our data set, growers appear only with their
ID numbers, so, other than the size of their production facilities (number of houses), we don’t have their
socio-economic characteristics.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Estimated eθi
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mit(Hit) that we introduced in Assumption 2 are satisfied. The data does not allow us to
estimate function m(.) and its first and second derivatives non-parametrically because the
sample size is not large enough for such a demanding estimation but one can use the parametric
form (13) for mortality from which it follows that
Hit = −η ln (1−mit)
and then estimate the parameter η by least squares.13 The results show that bη = 26, 300
(with the standard error of 445) and the functional fit is quite good with R2 = 79%. When
estimating η’s that vary across feeder pigs type, the R2 goes up to 85% while the estimates
of η are 26, 000 (s.e. 638); 27, 300 (s.e. 724); and 15, 100 (s.e. 708) for the three different
types of animals. Notice that for the mortality function in (13), the assumption that led to
our Propositions, i.e., 2m0 +m00H > 0 is satisfied if H < 2η. Since the observed values of Hit
are between 1,100 and 1,500 per house, this condition is easily satisfied. Controlling for the
13Here we assumed that the mortality rate is exogenous to the number of animals placed, i.e., no other
unobserved factors jointly affect the number of feeder pigs placed and their subsequent mortality.
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density of animals in the housing facilities, the prediction of the mortality rate is even better
showing that mortality and H are almost deterministically related.
Next, using the structural estimates of adjusted risk aversion parameters eθi, we want to
test the main propositions of the paper. We want to test whether the integrator supplies
more feeder pigs to less risk averse growers by looking at the relationship between Hit and eθi.
First, non-parametric tests of independence between Hit and eθi, or the average over contracts
of Hit for grower i and eθi show that independence is strongly rejected. The Spearman rank
correlation coefficient is negative and strongly significant. Next, a non-parametric estimate of
E(Hit | eθi) obtained by using a standard kernel regression method (shown in Figure 2) clearly
indicates that E(Hit | eθi) is a strictly decreasing function of eθi, and so does a linear regression
model (whose results are not reported here).
Figure 2: Non parametric estimate of E(Hit | eθi) and confidence interval
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Next, the elasticity of the number of animals placement with respect to adjusted risk
aversion is uniquely identified. A non parametric estimation of E
³
lnHit | lneθi´ shows that
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Figure 3: Non parametric estimate of E(κ0 | eθi) and confidence interval
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we cannot reject that this function is linear (see Appendix 6.4) and the linear regression gives
the estimate
∂E(lnHit|lneθii)
∂ lneθi = −0.84 with a robust standard error of 0.02. This result shows
that a 10% increase in absolute risk aversion results in a 8.4% decrease in the number of
animals that the integrator would place on the grower’s farm. Based on Proposition 2, this
result suggests that the weight of feeder pigs should increase with growers’ risk aversion. The
result is confirmed by looking at the elasticity of survived animals with respect to risk aversion,
i.e.,
∂E(lnHsit|lneθi)
∂ lneθi = −0.85(0.02) > −1, which based on Proposition 1, says that the weight
of the incoming feeder pigs (κ0) that the integrator places on a grower’s farm would increase
with risk aversion if and only if the elasticity of survived animals with respect to eθi is greater
than −1. A non-parametric estimate of the weight of incoming feeder pigs conditional on the
risk aversion parameter shown in Figure 3 seems to indicate that E(κ0it | eθi) is an increasing
function of eθi. In fact, a parametric estimate of the elasticity provide quite precise results
since\∂ lnκ0it
∂ lneθi = 0.04(0.01).
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4.2 Cost of moral hazard
The welfare cost of moral hazard emanates from the observability problem and the fact that
contract growers are risk averse and face uncertain income streams. The volatility of income
constitutes a direct real cost to growers and can be thought of as the cost of moral hazard in the
sense that without moral hazard, integrators could pay growers constant wages to compensate
them for their effort in case effort were observable and verifiable. However, obtaining the
exact welfare estimates of the cost of moral hazard is impossible because the marginal cost of
effort (γi) and the absolute risk aversion coefficient (θi) are not identified. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to look at the relationship between the mean and the variance of growers’ revenues
and their adjusted risk aversion parameters eθi. First, 60% of the variance of total payments
to growers, Rit, is explained by the between-growers variance. Second, a linear regression
shows a significant negative relationship between the within-grower variance (estimated for
each grower along the time dimension of the panel data) and adjusted risk aversion eθi. Also,
the mean payment is significantly decreasing with adjusted risk aversion. The grower level
variability of income is such that the average standard deviation is $3,960 with a median of
$2,856. The above results point out that the cost of moral hazard to growers is likely to be
substantial.
Moreover, it is important to note that the costs of asymmetric information arise not only
from the fact that part of the performance risk (in terms of feed conversion) has to be borne by
growers (because they have to be given the correct incentives), but also from the fact that the
integrator allocates different number of animals to different growers according to their types.
We anticipate that more risk averse growers (or growers with higher cost of effort) would have
lower revenues because, ceteris paribus, they perform worse in terms of the feed conversion ratio
(which reduces their bonus payment), but also because they receive fewer animals compared
to the less risk averse growers.
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Notice however that the relationship between grower risk aversion and his expected revenue
is theoretically ambiguous. Looking at the equilibrium effort equation (9), it follows that the
optimal effort decreases with higher risk aversion but also with β˜ and hence Hit. Therefore,
since more risk averse growers receive fewer animals (Hit), the overall comparative statics
effect of risk aversion on the unconditional optimal effort and hence on the expected revenue
is undetermined.
The empirical results show that the revenues of more risk-averse growers are less volatile
but, also, on average lower. Table 2 shows the average of the means and standard deviations
of each grower’s revenue Rit for different percentiles of the distribution of eθi. Except for the
50-60 percentiles of the distribution, the relationship shows a negative link between the mean
and the variance of grower revenue and adjusted risk aversion. This empirical result shows that
the net effect of adjusted risk aversion on revenue is negative. This net effect is a combination
of the indirect effect of eθi on the equilibrium values of H and κ0 via the fixed component and
the incentive power of the payment, and the direct effect of eθi on performance through effort
provision.
4.3 Heterogeneity in reservation utilities
Referring back to expressions for contract parameters (4) and (5), the measurement error in the
weight of animals at the end of the production period implies that α˜it is observed with an error
but not β˜it. Let’s assume that κit is thus measured with an i.i.d. error εit that is supposed
to be uncorrelated with κ0it and Hit. The observed weight of finished animals is therefore
fκit = κit + εit and then the observed fixed component of the payment is α˜∗it = α˜it + ςit where
ςit = α (1−mit)Hitεit because
α˜∗it = α˜it + ςit = α [fκit (1−mit)− κ0it]Hit = α [κit (1−mit)− κ0it]Hit + α (1−mit)Hitεit.
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Table 2: Risk Aversion and Revenue
Distribution of eθi Mean Rit Average Per Grower
percentiles (interval) (in US$) Standard Deviation of Rit
0-10% (6.1-11.2) 32 709 6 491
10-20% (11.2-12.2) 25 087 5 914
20-30% (11.2-12.5) 23 623 3 969
30-40% (12.5-14.2) 21 227 3 195
40-50% (14.2-17.3) 17 947 2 197
50-60% (17.3-19.8) 18 408 5 971
60-70% (19.8-21.1) 12 906 2 570
70-80% (21.1-23.1) 12 651 3 164
80-90% (23.1-26.2) 11 466 1 999
90-100% (26.2-52.9) 10 995 1 949
It follows that (15) becomes
Wit(Rit (H∗it, κ
∗
0it) , e
∗
it) = α˜
∗
it +
(1− γi)2
2σ2θi
− γiλβ˜
∗
it − ςit.
Taking into account the fact that the participation constraint (14) is binding, we obtain that
α˜∗it = Ωi + γiλβ˜
∗
it + ς it (18)
with E (ς it|κ∗0it,H∗it,Ωi) = α (1−mit)HitE (εit|κ∗0it,H∗it,Ωi) = 0 and Ωi =W i − (1−γi)
2
2σ2θi
.
Remark that this expression comes from the certainty equivalent utility of the agent (15)
and the assumption of binding participation constraint (14). It allows to identify the reservation
utility of the agent thanks to variations in the contractual terms (α˜it, eβit) across contracts for
a given grower (in addition to the variation across growers). As already stated, we assume
that the variation in contracts for a given grower is exogenous and comes from varying total
demand at the upstream level for the principal, implying that the Principal varies the total
number of animals raised per period.
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Then, with data on performance fit, α˜∗it, κ0it,H
∗
it, and β˜
∗
it, equation (18) allows, in principle,
the identification of all coefficients γiλ if one has an infinite number of contracts per grower.
However, the number of contracts per grower will be small relative to the number of growers and
the estimates of γiλ based on short time series of contracts per grower will be very imprecise.
Thus we prefer to introduce an additional assumption that all growers have the same cost of
effort, namely that ∀i : γi = γ, then the parameter γλ is identified with (18) and we can test
the implications of the following proposition (remark that now eθi = θi1−γ and thus eθi and θi
can be confounded up to a scale factor):
Proposition 3:
• The agent’s reservation utility is a weighted sum (with unknown weights γ ∈ (0, 1)) of Ωi
identified from (18) and Ψi = 1
2σ2eθi identified from (17) using performance data:
W i = Ωi + (1− γ)Ψi.
• A lower bound W iinf and upper bound W isup on the reservation utility of agent i, W i, are
identified because
Ωi =W
i
inf ≤W i ≤W
i
sup = Ωi +Ψi. (19)
• If Ωi
³eθi´ is decreasing in eθi, then one can reject that W i ³eθi´ is increasing in eθi (even
weakly).
Proof: See Appendix 6.3.¤
Proposition 3 shows that invoking the assumption that contracts are indeed optimal allows
the identification of a lower and an upper bound on the agents’ reservation utility. This enables
testing the model restriction γλ > 0, and exploring the correlation between Ωi and eθi, as well
as the relationship between W iinf , W
i
sup and eθi.
To address the issue of growers’ reservation utilities we estimate equation (18) with ob-
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servations on α˜∗it and β˜
∗
it.
14 Using generalized least squares, we obtain consistent estimates
of {Ωi}i=1,..,I and γλ. The estimate of γλ shows a significant and positive value (cγλ = 0.80
(0.006)), indirectly confirming the validity of the model. Recall that both the cost of effort and
the ability parameters need to be positive, so their estimated positive product does not reject
the model. An F test that all Ωi are equal strongly rejects the null hypothesis, with F (121,
679)=16.11 and p-value=0.000. Also, remembering that the parameter γ could be grower spe-
cific, we estimated equation (18) using grower specific coefficients for β˜
∗
it. Unfortunately, due
to insufficient number of observations all these coefficients are imprecisely estimated. A test of
homogeneity across individuals is not rejected but not very convincingly given the test’s lack
of power.
Figure 4: Nonparametric estimate of E(W iinf | θi) and E(W isup | θi) with confidence intervals
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14Assuming that the reservation utility of a given farmer is constant over time, whereas the offered contract
terms α˜∗it and β˜
∗
it vary for a given farmer across time, are crucial aspects of our identification strategy. Such
within-farmer variance in contract terms is coming from shocks to the principal’s costs as prices of both feeder
pigs and feed grains vary over time.
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With the obtained estimates, we look at the relationship between Ωi and θi. A linear
regression shows that they are strongly negatively correlated; the same goes for the relationship
between W iinf or W
i
sup and θi. A non parametric estimate of the relationship between Ωi and
θi shows that it is clearly decreasing. Since Ωi consists of two components, the reservation
utility W i and −(1− γ)Ψi which is increasing in θi, it follows that the reservation utility W i
has to be decreasing in θi. This result implies that agents with higher risk aversion have lower
reservation utilities because of lower outside opportunities. Figure 4 shows a non parametric
estimate of the upper and lower bound estimates of the reservation utility15.
Finally, notice that if we considered the fact that agents could take into account the risk-
iness of the final weight of animals κit, then we should have modified the agent’s revenue
certainty equivalent by adding the mean-variance value of this additional risk denoted as ηit.
Assuming that this random shock is of mean zero and constant variance across agents, the
agent’s certainly equivalent revenue (15) would become
Wit(Rit (H∗it, κ
∗
0it) , e
∗
it) = α˜
∗
it +
(1− γ)2
2σ2θi
− γλβ˜∗it − θivar [ηit]
One can show easily that in this new model, Ωi would become Ωi =W i − (1−γ)
2
2σ2θi
+ θivar [ηit].
Although, this approach would weaken the possibility to identify the agents’ reservation util-
ities (because the absolute value of θi is not identified), the additional term θivar [ηit] being
increasing in θi, would reinforce the fact that W i has to be decreasing in θi when Ωi decreases
in θi, which has been empirically confirmed. Thus, this additional complexity would confirm
the negative relationship between risk aversion θi and reservation utility Ωi.
15The reason why it seems that only one curve appears on the graph is that, given the scale, these two curves
are extremely close. This is due to the fact that the term Ψi which is the difference between Ωi = W
i
inf and
W
i
sup is very small compared to Ωi.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the question of optimal contracting under moral hazard when agents
are heterogenous. In this case, heterogeneity calls for individually designed contracts, which
stands in sharp contrast to what have been frequently observed in the real world. The examples
of principals using seemingly uniform contracts when dealing with heterogenous agents are
found in many agricultural sectors, particularly in livestock production contracts for broilers,
turkeys, and hogs. Two main elements of all agricultural production contracts are the payment
mechanism and the division of responsibilities for providing inputs. The payment mechanism
consists almost always of a variable piece rate with bonuses for the efficient use of the principal-
supplied inputs and is always the same for all agents. However, contracts never specify the
quantity and quality of the integrator-supplied inputs to each grower. We show that the
observed contracts are only nominally uniform, and that the principals are using their discretion
when it comes to matching inputs with agents of different characteristics (risk aversion and/or
cost of effort). Using this variation in contract variables, the principal in fact manages to
design the individualized contracts that are tailored to fit the individual growers’ preferences
or characteristics.
The paper has two conceptually distinct parts. In the first part (Model 1) we develop
an analytical framework for the econometric estimation of the heterogeneity parameter (risk
aversion corrected by the cost of effort) of the contracting producers and carry out its empirical
estimation using the individual growers performance data from the swine industry contracts.
We found that contract farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversions (and/or
cost of effort) and that this heterogeneity affects the principal’s allocation of production inputs
across farmers. This results fits well with some of the earlier findings from the channel contract
behavior literature. For example, the difference in farmers’ risk attitudes has been discovered
by Pennings and Wansink (2004) who found wide variation in risk attitudes among Dutch
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hog producers: 39% were risk averse, 4% risk neutral, and 57% were risk seeking. The main
characteristic of this part of the paper is that it takes the observed contract as given and model
the behavior of the agents under the observed contractual terms without using any optimality
argument about the contract design.
The obtained results are then used to look at the cost of moral hazard associated with this
heterogeneity of grower types. We show that the costs of asymmetric information arise not
only from the fact that part of the performance risk has to be borne by growers (because they
have to be given the correct incentives to perform), but also from the fact that the integrator
allocates different number of animals to different growers according to their efficiency. More risk
averse growers (or those with higher cost of effort) will have lower expected revenues because
on average they perform worse, but also because they receive fewer animals compared to the
less risk averse growers (or those with lower cost of effort). These results were confirmed in a
variety of different empirical tests. They provide evidence about the risk sharing - incentives
trade-off underlying contractual relationships under moral hazard and uncertainty.
In this context an interesting question would be whether the principal could diversify risk for
growers with payments indexed to some pooled performance, which would seem to be cheaper
than choosing the right number and size of hogs for each farm.16 In fact, tournament-type
payments are frequently used in production contracts where the common shock is important.
For example, the contracts for production of broiler chickens are almost exclusively settled via
cardinal tournaments. In such a scheme the payment to the contract grower consists of a base
payment per pound of live weight plus the bonus payment that is determined by comparing
an individual grower’s performance (say feed conversion) to the group average performance.
The average performance is determined by all growers whose chickens were harvested within
the same week. Since the main reason for the use of tournaments is the elimination of the
16This interesting question was raised by one of the referees.
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common production shock, it is important that the groups are formed such that all growers in
the same group are exposed to the same common shock (temperature and humidity are very
important determinants of the chicken metabolism). Having said this, it is obvious why the
tournament-type settlements are never used in hog production contracts. First, the cycle is too
long (19-20 weeks) and the scale of operation tends to be large, so the principal contracts with
fewer growers which makes the assembly of groups that would be exposed to the same common
shock difficult. Second, the available empirical evidence shows that common shock dominates
the idiosyncratic shock in the production of chickens (see Levy and Vukina, 2004), however
some preliminary empirical evidence points to the conjecture that the result is opposite in the
production of hogs.
In the second part of the paper (Model 2) we use both the assumption of contract optimality
and the fact that the contract payments are accurately observed in the data. Using the contract
optimality assumption as an identifying restriction, we were able to obtain estimates of the
bounds on agents’ reservation utilities (although point estimates are not obtained because the
cost parameter remains unidentified). We show that farmers with higher risk aversion have
lower outside opportunities and hence lower reservation utilities. The obtained results fit well
with some of the earlier literature on unemployment. An inverse relationship between the
degree of risk aversion and the level of reservation wages has been backed up by experimental
evidence on individual job search behavior (Cox and Oaxaca, 1992), and more recently, with
empirical data (Pannenberg, 2007).
Finally, some interesting research directions can be outlined. Given access to adequate data,
adding the problem of adverse selection to the existing problem of moral hazard would present
an interesting extension. Although the assumption that the principal can perfectly observe
agents’ types in this industry seems realistic, given the repetitive nature of contracting between
the principal and the same group of agents, the question of endogenizing the distribution of
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agent types willing to contract with the principal would be interesting. This would amount
to allowing agents to choose between different types of contracts. For example, keeping the
research focus on contracting in agriculture, it would be interesting to look into choices that
farmers make when deciding to specialize in the contract production of various types of animals
or crops. One example could be signing a contract for the production of hatching eggs or the
production of broiler chickens in cases where both contracts are offered by the same integrator
in the same area. Another example may be in the swine sector where the choices can be
made among signing a contract for the production of finished hogs, versus signing a farrow-to-
finish, or a wean-to-finish contract. Besides the methodological difficulties, the main problem
with this type of research is to find data on multiple contracts settlements from the same
geographical area. With appropriate data one could fully analyze the initial matching between
agents characteristics and the types of activity, making the distribution of agents’s preferences
and reservation utilities endogenous. This new step in the empirical research on contract
theory will help understand the full industry structure of vertical contracts in many areas of
agriculture and beyond.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using (3) and the optimal grower effort (9), removing the argument of mit for notational
convenience, the integrator’s expected profit becomes
Eπit = pκit (1−mit)Hit + wF
Ã
1
β˜itσ2eθi − φ+ αwF
!
[κit (1−mit)− κ0it]Hit − wH (κ0it)Hit
=
∙
p− wF
µ
φ− α
wF
¶¸
κit (1−mit)Hit − wF
κ0it
β(1−mit)σ2eθi
+
∙
wF
µ
φ− α
wF
¶
κ0it −wH (κ0it)
¸
Hit + wF
κit
βσ2eθi .
The first order condition for the integrator’s expected profit maximization with respect to Hit
and κ0it are
∂Eπit
∂Hit
= 0 =
∙
p− wF
µ
φ− α
wF
¶¸
κit
µ
∂
∂Hit
[(1−mit)Hit]
¶
−wF
κ0it
βσ2eθi m
0
it
(1−mit)2
+
∙
wF
µ
φ− α
wF
¶
κ0it − wH (κ0it)
¸
∂Eπit
∂κ0it
= 0 = wF
"µ
φ− α
wF
¶
Hit −
1
β(1−mit)σ2eθi
#
− w0H (κ0it)Hit
Taking derivative of the condition ∂Eπit∂κ0it = 0 with respect to
eθi gives
∂κ0it
∂eθi = − wFβσ2w00H (κ0it) ∂∂eθi
"
1eθi(1−mit)Hit
#
=
wF
βσ2w00H (κ0it)
³eθi(1−mit)Hit´2
∙
(1−mit)Hit + eθi ∂∂Hit [(1−mit)Hit] ∂Hit∂eθi
¸
Since w00H (κ0it) > 0,
∂κ0it
∂eθi has the sign of
(1−mit)Hit + eθi ∂∂Hit [(1−mit)Hit] ∂Hit∂eθi
= (1−mit)Hit
"
1 +
eθi
(1−mit)Hit
∂
∂Hit
[(1−mit)Hit]
∂Hit
∂eθi
#
= (1−mit)Hit
∙
1 +
∂ ln [(1−mit)Hit]
∂ lneθi
¸
Therefore ∂κ0it
∂eθi > 0 if and only if ∂ ln[(1−mit)Hit]∂ lneθi > −1.¤
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Taking the derivative of the first order condition ∂Eπit∂Hit = 0 with respect to
eθi, we have
0 = [p− φwF + α]κit
∂2
∂H2it
[(1−mit)Hit]
∂Hit
∂eθi (20)
− wF
βσ2
∂
∂eθi
∙
κ0iteθi m
0
it
(1−mit)2
¸
+
£
φwF − α− w0H (κ0it)
¤ ∂κ0it
∂eθi
Given Assumption 2, we know that the number of survived animals is a concave function of
the number of placed animals, ∂
2
∂H2it
[(1−mit)Hit] < 0. Also, prices and parameters are such
that [p− φwF + α] > 0 (confirmed by the data) and [φwF − α− w0H (κ0it)] < 0, due to the
properties of the cost function for feeder pigs. Notice that in order for the second condition
to hold, it is sufficient that the marginal cost of producing feeder pigs be at least as large
as the feeding cost (i.e. the target feed conversion ratio (φ) times the price of feed (wF )).
This assumption cannot be checked within the existing data set because, as explained before,
the price data has been constructed from secondary sources and the feeder pigs prices are
market averages across all weights that were transacted in that time period. However, a casual
inspection of the feeder pig prices for various weight categories published by USDA (2004)
confirms the assumption that w0H (κ) is large enough to offset the feed cost φwF observed in
our data. Having said this, we see that
∂
∂eθi
∙
κ0iteθi m
0
it
(1−mit)2
¸
= −κ0iteθ2i
m0it
(1−mit)2
+
1eθi m
0
it
(1−mit)2
∂κ0it
∂eθi + κ0iteθi ∂∂Hit
∙
m0it
(1−mit)2
¸
∂Hit
∂eθi
=
κ0iteθ2i
m0it
(1−mit)2
"
−1 +
eθi
κ0it
∂κ0it
∂eθi + eθi (1−mit)
2
m0it
∂
∂Hit
∙
m0it
(1−mit)2
¸
∂Hit
∂eθi
#
=
κ0iteθ2i
m0it
(1−mit)2
⎡
⎣∂ lnκ0it
∂ lneθi +
∂ ln m
0
it
(1−mit)2
∂ lneθi − 1
⎤
⎦
< 0 if
∂ lnκ0it
∂ lneθi +
∂ ln m
0
it
(1−mit)2
∂ lneθi < 1
Thus, ∂Hit
∂eθi < 0 implies ∂κ0it∂eθi > 0 as soon as ∂ lnκ0it∂ lneθi +
∂ ln
∙
m0it
(1−mit)2
¸
∂ lneθi < 1 (because also wFβσ2 > 0).
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Empirically, the mortality function is such that ∂ ln
∂ lneθi
h
m0it
(1−mit)2
i
= ∂ ln
∂ lneθi
³
∂
∂Hit
³
1
1−mit
´´
is
almost zero and the elasticity of κ0it with respect to eθi is \∂ lnκ0it∂ lneθi = 0.04 (0.01). The estimated
mortality function is such that m
0
it
(1−mit)2 is very small. If the mortality function is such that we
can cancel this term because m
0
it
(1−mit)2 ' 0 then equation (20) implies that
∂κ0it
∂eθi and ∂Hit∂eθi will
be of opposite signs.¤
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
By definition of Ωi
W i = Ωi +
(1− γi)2
2σ2θi
= Ωi + (1− γi)
1
2σ2 θi1−γi
= Ωi + (1− γi)Ψi
where Ψi =
1−γi
2σ2θi
= 1
2σ2eθi .
Then, as 0 < γi < 1, we obtain the inequality (19). As Ωi is identified from (18) and
1−γi
σ2θi
is identified by (17), which also identifies Ψi =
1−γi
2σ2θi
, the bounds on inequality (19) are
identified.
When γi = γ for all i, W i
³eθi´ = Ωi ³eθi´+(1− γ)Ψi ³eθi´ where 0 < γ < 1 and Ψi ³eθi´ is
a decreasing function of eθi = θi1−γi . Thus, one can reject that W i (θi) is increasing in θi (even
weakly) if Ωi (θi) is non increasing in θi. ¤
6.4 Additional results
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Figure 5: Nonparametric estimate of E
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lnHit | lneθi´
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